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WHOSE DEFENSE IS IT ANYWAY? REDEFINING THE ROLE 
OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN THE DEFENSE OF 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
ABSTRACT 
When the Obama Administration announced it would cease defending the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in litigation, it demonstrated the increasing 
fluidity inherent in the Executive Branch custom of defending federal statutes. 
After three years of setting aside its opposition to DOMA, the Administration 
adopted a newfound interpretation of DOMA’s Section Three and abruptly 
abandoned its defense. While the House Bipartisan Leadership Advisory 
Group eventually undertook the law’s defense, it met obstacles in finding a 
litigant on its behalf. Partisan opposition to the Advisory Group’s decision to 
defend DOMA and a prominent U.S. law firm withdrawing its representation 
jeopardized the law’s defense.  
The circumstances surrounding DOMA show the vulnerability of laws 
enacted by Congress. While the Executive Branch has often used its 
enforcement powers to exert control over the effects of certain laws, recent 
decades have also seen it utilize its status as the primary defender of the 
interests of the United States to sidestep laws with which it disagrees. As 
statutes face constitutional legal challenges, the Executive Branch has 
increasingly refrained from defending statutes. 
This Comment argues that the Legislative Branch should undertake the 
primary role in statutory defense to stop the detrimental effect that the 
nondefense of statutes has on the separation of powers. This Comment 
contends that defending federal statutes is not within the President’s Article II 
powers, and that a growing trend toward departmentalism supports the 
Legislative Branch’s ability to argue its own interpretation of a law’s 
constitutionality. As such, this Comment proposes a new Legislative Branch 
office charged with the primary responsibility of defending federal statutes and 
describes how such a change could occur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“After careful consideration . . . the President of the United States has made 
the determination that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), as 
applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”1 Though vowing to 
continue the enforcement of DOMA,2 this declaration ended the Obama 
Administration’s begrudging defense3 of the law.4 As pundits debated the 
political ramifications of President Obama’s decision, the lesser discussed, but 
arguably most important, issue was the emerging trend of the Executive 
Branch refusing to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes challenged in 
litigation. 
The difficulty in responding to this trend is heightened by the fact that the 
constitutional parameters of the Executive Branch’s defense of statutes have 
yet to be firmly established.5 While the practice has existed for over 140 
years,6 the evolution of constitutional interpretative theory among the three 
branches of government has confounded the once-shared understanding of how 
statutes are to be defended.7 Indeed, the move from a strict adherence to 
judicial supremacy to a broad acceptance of departmentalism8 has contributed 
 
 1 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Attorney 
General’s Letter] (citation omitted), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 2 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 3 See Lindsey Ellerson, Obama Justice Department Defends Defense of Marriage Act—That Candidate 
Obama Opposed, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/06/obama-
justice-department-defends-defense-of-marriage-act-that-candidate-obama-opposed. 
 4 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. In addition to the Obama Administration deciding not to 
defend DOMA in two cases that arose in the Southern District of New York and the District of Connecticut, 
the Attorney General also stated explicitly in this letter that he would “instruct Department attorneys to advise 
courts in other pending DOMA litigation of the President’s and my conclusions that . . . Section 3 is 
unconstitutional under [heightened scrutiny] and that the Department will cease defense of Section 3.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 5 Compare Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 
970 (1983) [hereinafter Executive Discretion] (arguing that the responsibility to defend statutes is inferred 
from the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws), with Dalena Marcott, Note, The Duty to Defend: 
What Is in the Best Interests of the World’s Most Powerful Client?, 92 GEO. L.J. 1309, 1312 (2004) 
(suggesting that the duty to defend statutes has been voluntarily accepted by the Department of Justice 
throughout the history of the Office of the Solicitor General). 
 6 The practice can be traced back to 1870 and the establishment of the Department of Justice, which 
included the Office of the Solicitor General. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, §§ 1–2, 16 Stat. 162, 162. 
 7 See infra Part II. 
 8 See infra Part II.A. While discussed later in this Comment, the term departmentalism refers to the idea 
that each of the three branches of government possesses the authority to render constitutional interpretations. 
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to the increasingly common occurrence of one branch declaring the actions of 
the others to be unconstitutional.9 Simultaneously, the general electorate and 
media’s understanding of each branch’s functions imposes political pressure 
and impedes the responses of each branch to such declarations.10 The result has 
been an ad hoc system of statutory defense that has muddled the question of 
whether and how a statute receives a defense.11 Within this context, the need to 
examine alternative methods of statutory defense becomes necessary to 
maintain a proper separation of powers. 
This Comment puts forth the argument that the duty to defend federal 
statutes in litigation should rest predominantly with the Legislative Branch. 
While many have addressed the practice as it has developed and persisted 
within the Executive Branch,12 the belief that the Legislative Branch should 
replace the Executive Branch as the primary defender in such litigation has 
received minimal attention.13 Admittedly, it would be very difficult for this 
idea to overcome and replace the existing practices and customs that have 
become entrenched throughout recent decades. However, the objective of 
expressing the argument is to serve as an impetus for creating more effective 
and efficient statutory defenses. This Comment recognizes the increasing 
frequency with which the Executive Branch refuses to defend statutes based on 
its belief that the statutes are unconstitutional,14 and it offers a potential 
solution that meets the political and institutional prerogatives of each branch. 
 
 9 Seth P. Waxman, Essay, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1073–74 (2001). 
 10 See Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban: A New 
Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591 (1997) (describing the 
effect of public opinion in support of President Clinton’s nondefense of the HIV provision, leading Congress 
to quickly repeal the law). 
 11 Currently, federal law permits the Office of Legal Counsel for either the Senate or House of 
Representatives to intervene or appear as amicus curiae only in legal actions or proceedings in which the 
powers and responsibilities of Congress are placed in issue, and only after being directed to do so. See Ethics 
in Government Act of 1978 § 706, 2 U.S.C. § 288e (2006). The law does not require that they intervene, 
however, and whether they do so remains unpredictable and is determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. 
 12 See, e.g., Drew S. Days III, Lecture, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many 
Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 499 (1994–1995); Waxman, supra note 9, at 1073; Executive Discretion, supra 
note 5; Marcott, supra note 5, at 1309. 
 13 See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914 (2012); see also James W. Cobb, Note, 
By “Complicated and Indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and the Separation of Powers, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 205, 224 (2004) (arguing against the Office of Senate Legal Council intervening to 
defend statutes). 
 14 See Tony Mauro, Duty to Defend? Not Always, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202473803028 (indicating that, since 2006, the Executive Branch has declined to 
defend a statute based on its perceived unconstitutionality at least thirteen times). 
HANSEN GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013 10:51 AM 
1162 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1159 
Part I shows that the defense of statutes is not encompassed by the 
President’s executive powers. Part I distinguishes the enforcement and defense 
of laws by explaining how the act of defending statutes arose within the 
Executive Branch out of tradition rather than constitutional authority. 
Accordingly, Part I illustrates that Congress may undertake the defense of 
statutes without intruding on executive powers. 
Part II describes the evolution of constitutional theory from its former 
adherence to judicial supremacy to its current acceptance of departmentalism. 
Part II examines the effect this shift has had on the defense of statutes and 
compares past examples of Executive Branch nondefense to President 
Obama’s recent decision not to defend DOMA. Part II illustrates how the 
Obama Administration’s DOMA decision differed from previous presidential 
decisions to not defend federal statutes, and it explains how departmentalism 
further justifies the abandonment of the current tradition of Executive Branch 
defense of statutes in favor of Legislative Branch statutory defense. 
Part III addresses the primary objection that the Legislative Branch defense 
of statutes would violate the anti-aggrandizement principle upheld in Bowsher 
v. Synar.15 Anticipating the counterargument that calling for Congress to 
defend statutes would encroach upon Executive Branch powers,16 Part III 
dispels this notion and argues that the ability to defend statutes exists within 
the inherent powers of Congress. 
Part IV then provides a model in which a Legislative Branch office, 
mirroring the functions and institutional responsibilities of the Solicitor 
General, serves as the more appropriate actor to defend acts of Congress. 
Though the proposed model cuts against the traditional Executive Branch role 
in defending statutes, Part IV demonstrates how allowing a Legislative Branch 
official to defend the constitutionality of Congress’s own laws will better 
ensure more zealous representation of statutes and strengthen the institutional 
and political interests of the Legislative and Executive Branches. 
 
 15 See 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of 
an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment”). 
 16 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to swear or affirm to “preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution”); id. § 3 (requiring the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). 
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I. DISTINGUISHING STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT FROM DEFENSE 
Congress ought possess the primary role in defending the constitutionality 
of federal statutes. To obviate separation-of-powers objections this idea may 
pose, this Part illustrates that statutory defense falls outside the scope of 
Executive Branch enforcement powers. This Part establishes the differences 
between enforcing and defending a statute and when the Executive Branch 
may become involved with a statute’s defense. It then explains how the 
Executive Branch emerged as the default actor in regard to defending statutes. 
Finally, it outlines recognized exceptions the Executive Branch has created to 
justify instances when it has abandoned its tradition of defending statutes. 
A. Separating Statutory Defense from Article II Duties 
Article II of the Constitution bestows upon the President duties to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”17 and to “preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.”18 Together, these duties require 
that the President execute19 the laws passed by Congress insofar as doing so 
does not violate the Constitution.20 Though the ideas of executing and 
defending laws often get conflated with each other, the two are not the same.21 
The two practices remain very distinct, and the differences between the two 
become tangible in actual application. 
 
 17 Id. § 3. 
 18 Id. § 1, cl. 8. 
 19 The words execute and enforce are used synonymously throughout this Comment, with no distinction 
intended between the two. A comparison of the legal definitions of both words illustrates the similarities 
between the two. Execution of a statute is “[t]he act of carrying out or putting [the law] into effect.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 650 (9th ed. 2009). Meanwhile, to enforce a law is “[t]o give force or effect to [the law]; to 
compel obedience.” Id. at 608. 
 20 Much scholarly work has been dedicated to the duty to enforce laws and the instances in which the 
President may refuse to enforce a law. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 905 (1989–1990); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable 
Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7; Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality 
of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113 (2007). However, this topic exceeds the 
scope of this Comment, and this Comment’s limited focus remains solely on the constitutional defense of 
statutes. 
 21 Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 291, 304 (2012) (“The decision not to defend a statute is distinct from the decision not to enforce 
it. . . . Because nonenforcement and nondefense are distinct and do not necessarily operate in tandem . . . [the 
President] must understand these differences.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Marcott, supra note 5, at 1312 
(suggesting that the duty to defend statutes has been voluntarily accepted by the Department of Justice 
throughout the history of the Office of the Solicitor General). 
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Defending a law has nothing to do with fulfilling the law’s purpose; rather, 
to defend is “[t]o contest and endeavor to defeat a claim or demand made 
against [the law] in a court of justice.”22 While the Executive Branch is 
charged with executing a statute from the time it becomes law, the same cannot 
be said of the need for defending a statute. For example, instances arise where 
the Executive Branch serves as the party challenging a particular statute.23 But 
even where that is not the case, the Constitution requires a case or controversy 
to first arise regarding the enforcement of a statute for its constitutionality to be 
challenged.24 Only after a case or controversy arises can a court hear the case, 
and it is then that the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), may undertake the statute’s defense.25 Consequently, many existing 
laws have been enforced but never required a defense because their 
constitutionality has never been questioned. 
The most frequent scenario in which the Executive Branch defends a 
statute’s constitutionality occurs in cases where the Executive Branch is 
involved from the outset because of its enforcement policies.26 For example, 
when an individual challenges the way in which an executed law or 
administrative agency action impacts his individual rights, a claim regarding 
the law’s constitutionality is often included. Because the Executive Branch is 
already involved through its enforcement, the DOJ also typically takes on any 
constitutional objection made by the opposing party and defends the Executive 
Branch’s decision to enforce the statute in the manner questioned. 
The second and more attenuated scenario of Executive Branch statutory 
defense involves a constitutional question that arises in litigation in which the 
federal government was not involved, such as a state criminal case27 or private 
 
 22 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (2d ed. 1910). 
 23 See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 9, at 1084 n.53. 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 25 See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 9, at 1084 n.53 (explaining that the Solicitor General only challenged 
the constitutionality of a provision that was passed to invalidate a previous Executive Branch decision). 
 26 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (illustrating a case where the actions of a federal 
agency were challenged in litigation); Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000) (illustrating a federal 
criminal case in which the Executive Branch prosecuted under federal law).  
 27 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (arising from a challenge to a Texas statute restricting 
abortion access); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (arising from prosecution under an Arizona 
kidnapping statute); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (arising from a challenge to a Connecticut 
statute forbidding the use of contraception); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (arising from prosecution 
under an Ohio law that prohibited the possession of obscene material). 
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law case.28 Because the resolution of a constitutional issue is in the interests of 
the United States, a DOJ representative may be sent at any time to a “State or 
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States.”29 
Even if the case rises to the Supreme Court and the United States government 
has yet to intervene or is not party to the case, the Solicitor General may 
represent the interests of the United States30 by filing a motion for divided 
argument.31 
The United States distinguishes itself from other countries in that the 
Executive Branch typically defends a statute’s constitutionality in either 
scenario described above. Compared to the distinction that exists in America 
between the enforcement and defense of statutes, some European countries 
have eliminated the need to defend statutes.32 
In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel (the Council) exists for the sole 
purpose of determining the constitutionality of a bill passed by the legislative 
branch.33 Instead of waiting for a case or controversy to arise like in the United 
States, the Council’s review occurs directly after the bill is passed but before it 
is published as law.34 Within one month of receiving the bill, and after at least 
sixty members of Parliament agree to have it reviewed, the Council must 
decide the bill’s constitutionality and accept or repeal it, in part or in full, 
based on that consideration.35 Thus, unlike in the United States, this type of 
preliminary review of the law’s constitutionality eliminates future scenarios in 
which the French government would need to involve itself in the defense of a 
law. 
 
 28 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (involving state law prohibiting 
contracts that disallowed workers from initiating class action lawsuits); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005) (arising from a city’s use of eminent domain to acquire land for economic development); Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (involving the prosecution of a business owner for violating state law 
regarding work contracts). 
 29 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006) (permitting DOJ officials to intervene as a party to the case, or, more 
commonly, to put forward a statement of interest or brief representing its position in the matter at issue).  
 30 See generally Days, supra note 12, at 487–88 (describing the Solicitor General requesting time to 
argue on behalf of the government). 
 31 This permits the Solicitor General to request time at oral arguments at the Supreme Court to express 
the interests of the United States in the case. See SUP. CT. R. 28. 
 32 See generally John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671 (2004) (describing how the Solicitor General argues on behalf of the government). 
 33 Id. at 1691. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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In Italy, a judge who must apply a statute in a particular case has the option 
to refer the law to the Italian Constitutional Court if the judge “has the slightest 
doubt concerning the ‘constitutionality’ of a statute . . . . [or] when she feels 
that the strict enforcement of the statute law may possibly result in injustice.”36 
The Constitutional Court then accepts or rejects the question and sometimes 
offers an interpretation of the law that comports with the constitution.37 This 
mechanism, though it empowers Italy’s judiciary considerably, allows for an 
alternative approach that prevents Italy’s government from having to defend its 
statutes in court. In this Comment’s subsequent discussion regarding 
alternative methods by which to defend statutes,38 practices such as these prove 
rather instructive. 
While examining the enforcement and defense of statutes in actual practice 
helps illustrate the differences between the two actions, a history of how the 
Executive Branch undertook the responsibility of defending statutes further 
distinguishes them. 
B.  Executive Branch Statutory Defense Is a Tradition and Not a 
Constitutionally Mandated Duty 
As discussed in the previous section, some mistakenly believe that 
defending a statute is inherent in the idea of enforcing it, and they associate the 
responsibility of statutory defense with the President’s constitutionally 
mandated duties.39 Yet examining the history related to the Executive Branch’s 
defense of statutes illustrates the vital differences that exist between the two. 
The development of statutory defense over time emphasizes the distinction 
between the enforcement and defense of statutes. History shows that 
“defending the constitutionality of congressional statutes in court [arose] as a 
practical arrangement, rather than a constitutionally mandated agreement.”40 
Though the Office of the Attorney General was created as part of the original 
Cabinet41 to “prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the 
United States shall be concerned,”42 Congress relied initially on independent 
 
 36 Id. at 1688 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See infra Part IV. 
 39 See, e.g., Executive Discretion, supra note 5 (arguing the responsibility to defend is inferred from the 
President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws). 
 40 Marcott, supra note 5, at 1312. 
 41 Id. at 1310. 
 42 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93. 
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solicitors to assist in its internal legal affairs.43 This ended, however, when the 
influx of litigation stemming from the Civil War became too expensive and 
placed an unmanageable burden on the federal government.44 Recognizing the 
futility of such scattered representation, Congress passed a law to centralize the 
legal matters of the government.45 The Act created the DOJ46 and established 
the Attorney General position to lead the Department’s efforts.47 
Along with creating the DOJ and the position of Attorney General, 
Congress sought to alleviate its cost-prohibitive practice of hiring private 
solicitors through the creation of a Solicitor General position.48 Congress 
intended the Solicitor General to be “an officer learned in the law, [who 
would] assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his duties”49 and help 
“[d]etermin[e] whether, and to what extent, appeals will be taken by the 
Government to all appellate courts.”50 Given this context, it appears as if “[t]he 
Solicitor General’s policy of defending congressional statutes may have 
originated as a result of the fact that, historically, Congress lacked the formal 
authority to litigate on its own behalf and thus generally relied upon the Justice 
Department to do so.”51 
Accounts of modern Solicitors General still support the general proposition 
that the defense of statutes is an Executive Branch tradition, not a duty. 
Statements by Solicitors General of both political parties reinforce the idea that 
defending statutes is separate and detached from the President’s Article II 
enforcement powers. Seth Waxman, who served as Solicitor General under 
President Clinton, stated that “[t]o the Congress, Solicitors General have long 
assumed the responsibility, except in rare instances, of defending the 
constitutionality of enactments.”52 Additionally, Theodore Olson, former 
Solicitor General under President George W. Bush, suggested that the Solicitor 
 
 43 See Marcott, supra note 5, at 1310. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162; Marcott, supra note 5, at 1310–11. 
 46 Marcott, supra note 5, at 1310–11. 
 47 Id. at 1311. 
 48 See Act of June 22, 1870 § 2 (establishing the Office of the Solicitor General); Marcott, supra note 5, 
at 1310–11 (explaining that Congress created the Office of the Solicitor General in the wake of an increase in 
government litigation following the Civil War, which resulted in a financial burden from hiring private 
attorneys). 
 49 Act of June 22, 1870 § 2. 
 50 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2012). 
 51 Days, supra note 12, at 501.  
 52 Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States as It Should Be”: The Solicitor General in 
Historical Context, J. SUPREME CT. HIST., Dec. 1998, at 3, 3 (emphasis added). 
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General has “long been responsible for defending the constitutionality of 
congressional statutes.”53 The omission from these statements of any 
connection between this assumed responsibility and a constitutional mandate 
illustrates the fact that such a defense is not constitutionally—or even 
statutorily—required. 
Beyond the inference drawn from the above statements, other Solicitors 
General have acknowledged explicitly that they are not bound by any 
constitutional requirement to defend a statute. Drew Days, who served as the 
Solicitor General prior to Seth Waxman under President Clinton, noted that 
“the Solicitor General has the power to decide whether to defend the 
constitutionality of the acts of Congress or even affirmatively challenge such 
laws.”54 Even more forceful in the matter was Robert Bork, who served as 
Solicitor General under Presidents Nixon and Ford.55 Bork stated, “[I]t would 
seem to me not only institutionally unnecessary but a betrayal of profound 
obligations to the Court and to constitutional processes to take the simplistic 
position that whatever Congress enacts [the Solicitor General] will defend, 
entirely as [an] advocate[] for the [United States].”56 One notable Solicitor 
General incorporated these sentiments into action when he, while serving as 
Solicitor General, refused to defend an FCC affirmative action program. There, 
“[t]he commission filed its own brief defending the program, and the court 
upheld it. The acting [S]olicitor [G]eneral who refused to defend the program, 
John G. Roberts Jr., is now [C]hief [J]ustice of the United States.”57 Waxman 
and Bork’s statements, and the actions of Chief Justice Roberts, show that the 
Executive Branch reserves the right not to carry out its traditional function of 
defending congressional legislation. Such would certainly not be the case, 
however, if defending statutes was constitutionally mandatory. 
Because the defending of statutes was initiated voluntarily and is still 
performed out of tradition, doing so remains distinct from the constitutionally 
mandated duty to enforce statutes. Thus, when confronted with a decision 
 
 53 Theodore B. Olson, U.S. Solicitor Gen., The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s Stewardship 
Through the Example of Rex E. Lee, Keynote Address at the Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the 
Solicitor General (Sept. 12, 2002), in 2003 BYU L. REV. 3, 7 (emphasis added). 
 54 Days, supra note 12, at 499 (emphasis added). 
 55 See Editorial, The Great Robert Bork, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, at A18; Theodore B. Olson, 
Remembering a Great American, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at B3. 
 56 Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 501 (1975) [hereinafter Representation of 
Congress Hearing]. 
 57 Adam Liptak, The President’s Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at WK5.  
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whether to defend the constitutionality of a statute, the President is not forced 
to offer a defense. Instead, he has four options from which to choose. The 
President may: (1) enforce and defend the statute; (2) enforce but not defend 
the statute;58 (3) not enforce the statute but defend it;59 or (4) not enforce or 
defend the statute.60 While the distinction between enforcing and defending 
becomes most prevalent in the second and third examples, this Comment 
analyzes only instances in which laws are enforced but not defended. 
C. Exceptions to the Executive Branch Tradition of Statutory Defense 
Since the Executive Branch is not required to defend statutes, instances 
occur where it refrains from offering a defense. Though there are no formal 
guidelines for Executive Branch officials to consult in making decisions to not 
defend statutes,61 two recognized exceptions exist that justify nondefense.62 
First, the Executive is not expected to defend a statute if the law encroaches on 
inherent powers of the Executive Branch.63 The second exception arises when 
“defending the statute would require the Solicitor General to ask the Supreme 
Court to overrule one of its constitutional precedents.”64 
1. Laws That Infringe on Executive Branch Power 
The first exception exists to protect the President from having to defend a 
law that potentially diminishes the powers of the Executive Branch.65 Without 
such an exception, the President would be deprived of the ability to challenge 
the law, thus making the Executive Branch susceptible to losses of power with 
 
 58 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
 59 While the notion of not enforcing but defending a statute may seem peculiar, many such examples 
arise upon a new presidential administration taking office and changing the policy of how a particular law is 
enforced. For example, President Obama in 2009 instructed the DOJ to not prosecute individuals who use or 
prescribe medical marijuana in states that have legalized such use. See John Nichols, The Nation: DOJ Backs 
Off Medical Marijuana, NPR (Oct. 20, 2009, 7:40 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=113959834. This, of course, remains constantly subject to change. See John Hoeffel, Obama Shifts to 
a Hard Line on Pot Sales, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A1. 
 60 See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. Wilson refused to enforce the Postmaster’s mandatory 
four-year term or removal with advice and consent of the senate, and the Solicitor General refused to defend 
the statute. Id. 
 61 Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 22, 1996), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/02/DOJ1996.pdf. 
 62 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1083. 
 63 See Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 973.  
 64 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1085. 
 65 See id. at 1084. 
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each similar law that Congress passes.66 Two well-known cases illustrate 
examples of when this first exception has been employed in the past. 
The first case, Myers v. United States,67 involved the President’s 
nondefense of a statute implicating his removal power. The law at issue in 
Myers stated that “Postmasters . . . shall be appointed and may be removed by 
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”68 When 
President Wilson removed Myers from his postmaster position without consent 
from the Senate, Myers objected and later sued for back pay on the basis that 
his dismissal violated the law.69 
Though Myers had challenged how President Wilson executed the statute, 
the Solicitor General refused to defend the law because he believed the 
limitations the law imposed on the President’s removal power were 
unconstitutional.70 The Court agreed and struck down the law.71 The 
uniqueness of the Solicitor General’s position—that the law was 
unconstitutional—was noted in oral arguments by Myers’s counsel: “In the 
136 years that have passed since the Constitution was adopted, there has come 
before this Court for the first time . . . a case in which the Government, through 
the Department of Justice, questions the constitutionality of its own act.”72 Yet 
in a gesture of approval, the Court closed its opinion by expressing its gratitude 
to, and implicit approval of, Senator George Pepper, the Legislative Branch 
member who argued for the law as amicus curiae.73 
Arguably the most well-known example of a President not defending a law 
that encroached on executive powers occurred in INS v. Chadha.74 In Chadha, 
the Court addressed the constitutionality of a one-House veto provision that 
enabled either House in Congress to invalidate a decision of the Attorney 
 
 66 Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 973–74. Even if a President objects to the law through the use of 
a veto, the President is rendered helpless without this exception if Congress possesses enough votes to override 
the veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. Moreover, a future President might object to a law enacted during a 
previous Administration, in which case he would have no recourse aside from not enforcing or defending the 
law. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200 
(1994). 
 67 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 68 Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69 Id. at 178 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 70 See id. at 108 (majority opinion). 
 71 Id. at 176. 
 72 Id. at 57 (reproducing a condensed version of the oral arguments). 
 73 Id. at 176. 
 74 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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General.75 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,76 Congress vested the 
United States Attorney General with the discretion to suspend deportation and 
grant permanent residency to aliens.77 Chadha, an East Indian alien, had been 
admitted to the United States on a student visa, but remained in the country 
after his visa had expired.78 Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Chadha applied for suspension of the deportation to an immigration judge, and 
the judge ordered the suspension of Chadha’s deportation.79 Based on this 
holding, the Attorney General recommended to Congress that Chadha’s 
deportation be suspended.80 Despite this, the House invoked its one-House 
veto power—as prescribed by the Immigration and Nationality Act—and 
rejected the Attorney General’s recommendation.81 Chadha filed suit, claiming 
that the House resolution was unconstitutional as a violation of separation of 
powers.82 
The Court in Chadha decided on a “categorical invalidation of the 
legislative veto”83 after declaring that Congress did not have the ability to 
overrule executive action without a resolution in both the House and Senate.84 
The Court invoked strong notions of formalism, emphasizing that each branch 
of government must confine itself to its assigned responsibility.85 Though 
admitting that these responsibilities are “not ‘hermetically’ sealed” from each 
other, the Court granted very little leeway in favor of this understanding.86 The 
Court found that the legislative veto “was not within any of the express 
constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone,” and that it was 
clearly “an exercise of legislative power” that required Article I authority.87 
 
 75 Id. at 923. 
 76 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
 77 Id. § 244(a) (repealed 1996). 
 78 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.  
 79 Id. at 923–24 (ordering the deportation suspended upon finding that Chadha “had resided continuously 
in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer ‘extreme hardship’ if 
deported”). 
 80 Id. at 925. 
 81 Id. at 927. 
 82 Id. at 928. 
 83 Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 599 (1990). 
 84 Id.; accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956–57. 
 85 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
 86 See id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 87 Id. at 956–57. 
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2. Requesting to Overturn Supreme Court Precedent 
The second exception to the practice of the Executive Branch defending 
federal statutes arises when “defending the statute would require the Solicitor 
General to ask the Supreme Court to overrule one of its constitutional 
precedents.”88 Thus, the cases arising under this exception usually “involve 
statutes whose constitutionality has been undermined by Supreme Court 
decisions rendered after the law’s enactment.”89 Alternatively, the exception 
arises when the Solicitor General makes a determination as to whether 
Supreme Court precedent should be overruled. Perhaps the most notable 
example of this came when the Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court to 
overrule the separate-but-equal doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson.90  
As can be seen in a more recent example, the Solicitor General remains 
cautious in arguing this exception. In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme 
Court evaluated a law that Congress passed soon after the Court’s famous 
Miranda v. Arizona91 decision.92 Rather than defend the statute and argue that 
the Court overturn Miranda and “the dozens of cases that have followed, 
applied, and extended [Miranda],”93 the Solicitor General refused to defend it 
because of “the Supreme Court’s repeated, consistent application of Miranda 
to the States.”94 In a 7–2 decision, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General 
and declined to overrule Miranda.95 
While the above exceptions to the defense of statutes are not codified or 
required, Solicitors General have tended to agree on the prudence of each.96 
More specifically, the exceptions have been justified by “the Solicitor 
General’s duty to account for the interests of all three branches of 
government.”97 Yet as the next Part describes, the relatively recent rise of 
departmentalism has led each branch to more actively account for its own 
 
 88 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1085. 
 89 Id. at 1086. 
 90 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Waxman, supra note 9, at 1087 & n.72. 
 91 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 92 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000). The law at issue made statements given to law enforcement officers 
admissible so long as the statements were voluntary and regardless of whether the defendant had been issued 
his Miranda rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). 
 93 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1088. 
 94 Id. at 1087. 
 95 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. 
 96 See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 9, at 1084–86; Executive Discretion, supra note 5, at 973–74. 
 97 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1084. 
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interests, thus causing the Executive Branch to stretch the boundaries of the 
exceptions for the nondefense of statutes. 
II. THE SHIFT OF STATUTORY DEFENSE TOWARD DEPARTMENTALISM 
Recognizing that approaches to constitutional interpretation change over 
time, this Part addresses a major change that has occurred relatively recently. 
The importance of the change is especially relevant because of its impact on 
how statutes have been interpreted and defended. This Part first discusses the 
shift from notions of judicial review to departmentalism, then examines the 
impact of that shift on statutory defense, and concludes with how President 
Obama has contributed to departmentalism’s impact on the defense of statutes. 
A. Erosion of Judicial Review and Judicial Supremacy 
By the mid-twentieth century, the Court had transformed Chief Justice 
Marshall’s notion of judicial review—that it was “the province and duty of the 
judicial department to [s]ay what the law is”98—into an idea more closely 
resembling judicial supremacy. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court interpreted 
Marbury v. Madison as “declar[ing] the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and [this] 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a 
permanent and indispensible feature of our constitutional system.”99 Thus, 
whereas Chief Justice Marshall’s notion of judicial review permitted the Court 
to strike down an act of a coordinate branch, the Court’s later interpretations 
attempted to empower the Court with a sense of judicial supremacy that 
created “the obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey that ruling but 
to follow its reasoning in future deliberations.”100 
However, fifteen years before the Court’s declaration in Cooper, the origins 
of what would eventually become the theory of departmentalism began 
emerging subtly. In 1943, Congress passed the Urgent Deficiency 
Appropriation Act.101 Though the law provided war funding for the military’s 
efforts in World War II, a provision in the law called for the withholding of 
 
 98 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 99 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 100 Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 359, 368 (1997) (quoting Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate 
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 407 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101 Ch. 218, 57 Stat. 431 (1943). 
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salaries for certain federal employees.102 Though President Roosevelt signed 
and enforced the law to prevent a delay in war appropriations, he announced 
his belief that the law’s provision withholding employee salaries was 
unconstitutional.103 When the federal employees who had been refused wages 
challenged the law in United States v. Lovett, President Roosevelt relied upon 
his own constitutional interpretation and refused to defend the statute.104 In 
place of an executive officer, Congress appeared as amicus curiae to defend the 
law to the Supreme Court.105 
The Court agreed with President Roosevelt and held the law in Lovett to be  
unconstitutional. More importantly, the Court remained silent as to whether 
President Roosevelt acted improperly in refusing to defend the statute.106 The 
implicit presumption, therefore, was that the President could make and act 
upon a determination of a statute’s constitutionality outside the confines of the 
previously discussed exceptions for statutory nondefense. Though it would 
take decades for others to act on this presumption, President Roosevelt’s 
decision not to defend the law in Lovett foreshadowed the transformation that 
would occur in constitutional interpretive theory throughout the latter half of 
the twentieth century.107 The heavy reliance on the Judicial Branch as the 
authoritative voice regarding the constitution would erode, thus allowing each 
branch to play a more active role in constitutional interpretation.108 
The Reagan Administration served as the clear leader in the movement 
toward equalizing the ability of each branch to render constitutional 
interpretations. Beginning in the 1980s, President Reagan’s DOJ expanded 
President Roosevelt’s example of executive nondefense of statutes beyond the 
 
 102 Id. § 304. 
 103 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946) (“The Senate yielded, as I have been forced to 
yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the war. But I cannot so yield without placing on record my view that 
this provision is not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 104 Id. at 306, 313 (noting that the President opined when signing the bill that the law was 
unconstitutional, and the Solicitor General, appearing for the government, joined the position that the law was 
unconstitutional). 
 105 Id. at 304 (identifying John C. Gall as amicus curiae by special leave of the Court arguing for Congress 
in favor of reversal). 
 106 See Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (abstaining from comment regarding President Roosevelt’s interpretation). 
 107 James L. Cooper, Note, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675, 675–77 
(1990) (describing the increase in Executive Branch particpation in the development of law during the Reagan 
Administration in the 1980s). 
 108 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987) (describing the view 
that all of the coordinate branches of government have a duty to interpret the Constitution).  
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traditionally recognized exceptions.109 Beginning with the premise that “in 
many instances the Constitution should be reinterpreted to prohibit the federal 
government from acting,”110 President Reagan’s DOJ released a series of 
reports111 that “express[ed] [a striking] independence from then-prevailing 
Supreme Court doctrine . . . . [and] constituted blueprints for what the Reagan 
[A]dministration believed the law should look like.”112 In addition, the Reagan 
Administration filed several amicus briefs to the Court that interjected its own 
constitutional interpretation into the arguments it made to the Court.113 
The Reagan Administration’s actions against judicial supremacy were 
arguably encompassed within a speech by then-Attorney General Edwin 
Meese. Meese explicitly spoke against the idea of judicial supremacy by 
asserting that a constitutional holding by the Court “does not establish a 
supreme law of the land that is binding on all persons and parts of government 
henceforth and forevermore.”114 Instead, Meese promoted the notion that 
constitutional interpretation was a function that had been entrusted equally to 
each branch of the government and not exclusively to the Judiciary.115 Though 
Meese’s claim would not come to fruition for a few more years, his efforts 
furthered the idea of what many now refer to as departmentalism. 
A few years after Meese’s speech, the theory of departmentalism came to 
the forefront, premised on the assertion that the coordinate branches possess 
coequal interpretive authority that remains unbound by the legal views of the 
other branches.116 Arguing that “[t]he power to interpret federal law is not a 
specifically-enumerated power of any particular branch,”117 proponents of 
departmentalism asserted that previous understandings of Marbury were 
wrong, and that judicial review is nothing more than “a special instance of the 
implied judicial power to interpret.”118 
 
 109 See Cooper, supra note 107, at 675–77.  
 110 Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential 
Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 385 (2003). 
 111 Id. at 385–86. 
 112 Id. at 386. 
 113 Cooper, supra note 107, at 688.  
 114 Meese, supra note 108, at 983. 
 115 Id. at 985–86. 
 116 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (discussing the Executive Branch’s power to interpret the law). 
 117 Id. at 241; accord Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 692 (2002).  
 118 Paulsen, supra note 116, at 241. 
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In that spirit, departmentalism “recognizes the authority of each federal 
branch or ‘department’ to interpret the Constitution independently.”119 While 
general agreement exists regarding the notion that each branch must interpret 
the Constitution to a certain extent in performance of its constitutional duties, 
debate centers on the scope of each branch’s interpretation.120 Proponents of a 
stronger form of departmentalism argue that lesser deference in the interpretive 
independence of each branch will result in better constitutional outcomes.121 
Others attempt to find commonality between the notions of departmentalism 
and judicial supremacy.122 While the scope of departmentalism remains 
unclear, its effect on the defense of statutes has become more apparent. 
B. Departmentalism’s Impact on the Defense of Statutes 
Recent years have seen a rise in Executive Branch nondefense of statutes123 
and an increase in the instances in which the Supreme Court has struck down 
laws as unconstitutional.124 One possible explanation is the presence of an 
emboldened Executive Branch that is more willing to inject political ideology 
into a tradition often thought of as politically neutral. However, the increased 
frequency of nondefense most likely reflects a growing acceptance of the 
coequal constitutional interpretation called for by departmentalism. 
One of the more familiar and relatively recent examples of executive 
nondefense of statutes provides evidence that departmentalism—not politics—
is causing the upward trend in statutory nondefense. In 1996, Congress passed 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.125 The Act 
provided military funding, but it also included an amendment that called for 
military discharges of all service members who had HIV.126 Though President 
Clinton vetoed the law after its first passage,127 Congress passed the Act again 
 
 119 Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 106. 
 120 See id. at 109 (arguing for a new theory of functional departmentalism that, as opposed to 
departmentalism, does not give plenary coequal power to the coordinate branches). 
 121 See Paulsen, supra note 116, at 330. 
 122 See Johnsen, supra note 119, at 109 (arguing for each branch to possess limited authority to act on 
independent constitutional interpretations).  
 123 See Mauro, supra note 14. 
 124 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1074 (noting that the Supreme Court struck down only 127 laws during the 
first 200 years following ratification of the Constitution, but has struck down twenty-six since 1995). 
 125 Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (repealed 1996). 
 126 Id. § 567, 110 Stat. at 328. 
 127 See Gussis, supra note 10, at 596 (citing the HIV provision among the reasons for which President 
Clinton vetoed the law upon its initial passage).  
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with a bipartisan majority.128 Upon signing the law,129 President Clinton 
announced that the provision regarding HIV-positive service members would 
not be defended by his Administration.130 Though that provision of the law did 
not invoke either of the established exceptions that justify statutory 
nondefense,131 President Clinton followed the actions of President Roosevelt in 
Lovett and instructed his DOJ not to defend the law in court because of his 
belief that the provision was unconstitutional.132 
Tensions existed regarding the scope of departmentalism within the debate 
surrounding President Clinton’s decision to not defend the law. Ardent 
supporters of judicial supremacy advocated for a heightened standard to 
prevent President Clinton’s DOJ from refusing to defend the law.133 Such a 
standard would have required “the Attorney General [to believe], not only 
personally as a matter of conscience, but also in his official capacity as the 
Chief Legal Officer of the United States, that a law is so patently 
unconstitutional that it cannot be defended.”134 In other words, this standard 
would have required the President to defend the law if reasonable arguments 
 
 128 Though Republicans held the majority in both houses, the vote in favor of the Act did not fall along 
partisan lines. In the House, the Act passed with 62% of the vote, including a third of all Democrats voting. 
See House Vote #865 in 1995, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h1995-865 
(last visited May 12, 2013). In the Senate, it passed with fifty-six votes and would not have passed without the 
votes of fourteen Democrat Senators voting across the aisle. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 104th Congress— 
2d Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm? 
congress=104&session=2&vote=00005 (last visited May 11, 2013). 
 129 President Clinton signed the bill into law, but successfully repealed it before the law went into effect. 
Gussis, supra note 10, at 597–98.  
 130 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
226 (Feb. 10, 1996). 
 131 See supra Part I.C. 
 132 See Press Briefing by Counsel to the President Jack Quinn and Assistant Attorney General Walter 
Dellinger (Feb. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Quinn and Dellinger Press Briefing], available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/ 
1996/02/1996-02-09-quinn-and-dellinger-briefing-on-hiv-provision.html. Other examples exist of when the 
President has decided not to defend laws based on his belief that the law is unconstitutional. See Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 2000 (1995); 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 
1963) (en banc). 
 133 See Gussis, supra note 10, at 604–23 (describing the established exception that a President can refuse 
to defend a statute if it is clearly unconstitutional, but arguing that, in refusing to defend the HIV provision, 
President Clinton used a lesser standard of declining to defend if the statute is probably unconstitutional). 
 134 Representation of Congress Hearing, supra note 56, at 10 (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. Rex E. 
Lee). 
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existed in its favor,135 and here Supreme Court precedent suggested that there 
were reasonable arguments to defend the HIV provision.136 
Yet the increasing trend toward departmentalism allowed President Clinton 
to rely upon a less strenuous standard for nondefense. Rather than promoting 
the reasonable arguments in favor of the law, President Clinton relied on the 
fact that the constitutionality of the statute had not been explicitly settled as a 
matter of law.137 Under this rationale, President Clinton transformed the 
practice from the Executive Branch submitting the question to the Court for 
resolution, to the Executive Branch making its own constitutional 
interpretation.138 As President Clinton’s decision not to defend the HIV 
provision showed, the movement toward departmentalism leaves much 
discretion to the President and allows the Executive Branch to make decisions 
tending to support policy preferences and the political agenda of the 
President.139 This standard provides the Executive Branch greater flexibility in 
assessing whether to defend a federal statute, and the Executive Branch has 
utilized this flexibility to consistently refrain from defending a statute. 
C. President Obama’s Contribution to the Growth of Departmentalism 
President Obama most recently illustrated the fluidity inherent in the 
President’s duty to defend statutes with his decision regarding DOMA. Prior to 
two cases arising in federal court, Windsor v. United States140 and Pedersen v. 
Office of Personnel Management,141 the Obama Administration had set aside 
its political opposition to DOMA and consistently defended the law against 
various constitutional challenges according to judicial precedent.142 This 
defense ended, however, upon Attorney General Eric Holder declaring that the 
Obama Administration’s newfound interpretation of Section Three of 
 
 135 The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 25, 25–26 
(1981) (“In my view, the Department has the duty to defend an act of Congress whenever a reasonable 
argument can be made in its support, even if the Attorney General and the lawyers examining the case 
conclude that the argument may ultimately be unsuccessful in the courts.”). 
 136 See Gussis, supra note 10, at 611–12 (describing Supreme Court precedent for judicial deference to 
congressional choices regarding the military). 
 137 Id. at 608. 
 138 See id. at 623–24. 
 139 See id. at 624. 
 140 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
 141 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (D. Conn. 2012). 
 142 Ellerson, supra note 3. 
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DOMA143 warranted a heightened level of legal scrutiny, which resulted in the 
conclusion that DOMA was unconstitutional.144 
Despite the growth of Executive Branch nondefense, the announcement by 
Attorney General Holder that the Obama Administration would cease its 
defense of DOMA generated a flurry of reactions throughout the country.145 
While much of the focus remained on how the decision was a significant shift 
in policy regarding a highly contentious topic,146 the lesser discussed issue 
concerned how the shift was conducted. Though nondefense was not foreign to 
the political landscape at the time, the Obama Administration’s asserted 
justification fell outside the nondefense framework and pushed 
departmentalism to a level never previously experienced. 
Pursuant to federal law,147 Attorney General Holder authored a letter to the 
House of Representatives and informed them of DOJ’s decision not to defend 
DOMA in the district court cases and the reason why.148 The Attorney General 
wrote that President Obama and he had “concluded that classifications based 
on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny,”149 under which “Section 3 
of [DOMA] . . . violates the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment.”150 That President Obama’s decision fell outside the scope of the 
recognized exceptions for the Executive Branch nondefense of statutes151 
illustrates the unique nature of President Obama’s actions. 
The Obama Administration illustrated a departmentalist approach in regard 
to DOMA by ignoring related caselaw and declaring that DOMA violated the 
Constitution. Though Attorney General Holder explained that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications 
 
 143 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (providing that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”). 
 144 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
 145 See, e.g., Jan Crawford, Obama Administration Decision to Not Defend Defense of Marriage Act Will 
Trigger Heated Political Battle, CBS NEWS (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
504564_162-20035495-504564.html. 
 146 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
 147 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1) (2006) (requiring that the Attorney General report to Congress “any instance 
in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice” decides not to enforce, apply, or 
administer a federal law on the ground that the law is unconstitutional, or decides not to defend a law against 
constitutional attack). 
 148 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See supra Part II.C. 
HANSEN GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013 10:51 AM 
1180 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1159 
based on sexual orientation,”152 many believe the Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. 
Texas153 suggests otherwise.154 In Lawrence, the Court recognized an 
individual’s liberty interest in taking part in homosexual sodomy and struck 
down an antisodomy law in Texas.155 However, the decision in Lawrence 
explicitly stopped short of declaring such conduct to be a fundamental right 
under the Due Process Clause and thus refrained from applying strict 
scrutiny.156 Some circuit courts have interpreted this to implicitly represent the 
Court’s determination regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny for 
classifications based on sexual orientation.157 Moreover, a majority of other 
circuits have come to the same conclusion for different reasons.158 
Notwithstanding the Court’s approach in Lawrence and the overwhelming 
approach regarding the level of scrutiny applied to the sexual-orientation-based 
classification within the federal circuit courts of appeals, the Administration 
evaluated the question according to criteria set forth in Bowen v. Gilliard159 
and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.160 Because of this, the 
Administration maintained that heightened scrutiny was the proper standard of 
review.161 
 
 152 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
 153 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 154 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that Lawrence does not mandate 
heightened scrutiny of an act classifying homosexuals); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 
(8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect classification for 
equal protection purposes.”); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Neither the Supreme 
Court nor this court has recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification . . . .”); cf. Veney v. Wyche, 
293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that discrimination based on sexual preference outside of the prison 
context is subject to rational basis review); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 
F.3d 289, 292–94 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding—even prior to Lawrence—that sexual orientation is not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class). 
 155 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 156 See id. (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”). 
 157 Cook, 528 F.3d at 61; Citizens for Equal Prot., 455 F.3d at 866; Johnson, 385 F.3d at 532; cf. Veney, 
293 F.3d 726; Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d 289. 
 158 Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 
464 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 159 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987) (considering the following criteria: whether the group in question has 
suffered a history of discrimination; whether individuals exhibit obvious, immutable characteristics that define 
them as a discrete group; whether the group is a minority or is politically powerless; and whether the 
characteristics distinguishing the group have little relation to legitimate policy objectives).  
 160 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985) (holding that the Court should use lesser scrutiny when the group 
affected by a law has distinguishing characteristics that are relevant to state policy interests). 
 161 Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1. 
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Under heightened scrutiny, President Obama “concluded that Section 3 of 
DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet that 
standard and is therefore unconstitutional.”162 Because of this conclusion, the 
Administration considered DOMA “the rare case where the proper course is to 
forgo the defense of this statute.”163 
At first glance, the Obama Administration’s decision regarding DOMA 
appears to comport with past instances of Executive Branch nondefense. 
Following the trend of departmentalism, where presidents make constitutional 
determinations regarding statutes, President Obama seemingly made his 
decision based on his own constitutional interpretation regarding DOMA. 
However, a closer examination shows President Obama’s nondefense of 
DOMA took a markedly different approach than recent examples of 
nondefense. While recent decisions not to defend a statute have gone beyond 
the two recognized exceptions for nondefense, presidents still formulated their 
opinions regarding the constitutionality of a statute based on prior judicial 
decisions.164 For instance, when President Clinton refused to defend a ban on 
HIV-positive individuals in the military, his decision relied on an established 
equal protection framework as defined by the Court.165 Notably, the Clinton 
Administration refrained from arbitrarily applying a higher level of scrutiny 
than the Court likely would have considered had it addressed the question. 
Instead, the Clinton Administration applied rational basis scrutiny because of 
the classification at issue and166 the fact that rational basis was the same 
standard that the Court presumably would have applied.167 Even under the 
lower standard of rational basis scrutiny, however, the Administration asserted 
no legitimate government interest existed in the Act’s legislative history and 
reports from military leaders.168 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Gussis, supra note 10, at 623–24 (describing how President Clinton’s determination that the HIV 
provision was unconstitutional considered both judicial precedent and policy goals). 
 165 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; see Quinn and Dellinger Press Briefing, supra note 132 (describing 
how President Clinton analyzed the HIV provision under rational basis review). 
 166 The classification at issue would have pertained to disability, and more specifically disabled 
individuals testing positive for HIV. Courts have generally held that classifications based on disability should 
receive only rational basis review. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
 167 See Quinn and Dellinger Press Briefing, supra note 132 (“We advised the President that this provision, 
which discriminates against a group of healthy and productive members of the Armed Services, would be 
constitutional only if it serves a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
 168 See Gussis, supra note 10, at 597–98, 620. 
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Comparing the Clinton and Obama Administration’s examples of 
Executive Branch nondefense exposes the differences between the 
circumstances of each. From a social and political perspective, President 
Obama found considerably wider support for his action. In addition to growing 
public sentiment in favor of gay marriage and an increasing number of states 
that recognize such marriages,169 Democrats in Congress also almost uniformly 
supported the President’s rebuke of DOMA.170 As compared to the 
circumstances faced by President Clinton in 1996, the year that Congress 
overwhelmingly passed DOMA, and the year that Democrats crossed party 
lines to vote for the National Defense Authorization Act (including the HIV 
provision), the barriers for President Obama to make this decision were far 
fewer in number and strength. 
However, President Obama’s DOMA decision was distinguishable from 
President Clinton’s nondefense decision in that it enjoyed far less support from 
legal precedent. Through its rejection of the approach taken by the Court in 
Lawrence and throughout various federal circuit courts of appeals, the Obama 
Administration failed to take into account judicial precedent and instead 
implemented its own constitutional theory that differed from the applicable 
standard established in Lawrence.171 While it can be argued that the Lawrence 
decision “leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples,”172 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion from Lawrence 
explicitly noted that “[t]he present case . . . . does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”173 
Thus, the Obama Administration carved out a new niche in due process 
jurisprudence and, in doing so, “moved the goalposts of the usual role of the 
Executive [B]ranch in defending statutes. . . . invest[ing] within DOJ a power 
to conduct an independent constitutional review of the issues . . . [and] 
 
 169 At the time this Comment was written, twelve states recognize gay marriage. See Mark Peters, 
Minnesota Is Set to Allow Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2013, at A6. 
 170 See Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives—Including Objecting Members of the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp., Representatives Nancy Pelosi & Steny H. Hoyer—as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 12-15388 & 12-
15409 (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Pelosi Amicus Brief] (arguing that Section Three of DOMA is 
unconstitutional). 
 171 See supra note 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 172 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173 Id. at 578 (majority opinion).  
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decid[ing] if there is a reasonable basis for arguing the other side.”174 John 
Yoo, the controversial former DOJ official from the Bush Administration 
credited with authoring the memos allowing for enhanced interrogation, agreed 
with President Obama’s decision and believed “it [was] justified under the 
Constitution’s original allocation of authority to the President.”175 Even while 
expressing support, however, Yoo noted that President Obama “[was] trying to 
change the meaning of the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction 
Amendments . . . where the Supreme Court has recently exercised the 
institutional lead . . . in its application to individual citizens.”176 
The ramifications of this approach further intensify the need for the 
legislative branch to play a greater role in the defense of statutes. Because the 
defense of statutes is becoming more contingent on the political preferences 
and constitutional theories of the Executive Branch, the likelihood of an 
effective defense becomes tenuous in circumstances where such beliefs 
converge with the application of a law. Rather than an objective evaluation of 
the statute, the Obama Administration utilized departmentalism’s focus on 
coequal interpretation amongst the branches to avoid defending a statute with 
which it disagreed. And while President Obama confronted the issue 
surrounding gay marriage, future presidents may face situations where they 
could refuse to defend laws regarding other contentious issues like health care, 
immigration reform, or abortion. On such issues, if Congress passed a law 
along a party-line vote, “the losing side just has to fashion some constitutional 
theories for why the legislation is unconstitutional and then wait for its side to 
win the Presidency. . . . [and then file] challenges to the legislation [that] will 
go undefended.”177 Accordingly, empowering the Legislative Branch to defend 
its statutes would help ensure that the political and constitutional beliefs of the 
Executive Branch do not solely determine a particular law’s viability. 
Lastly, while the President is probably more unlikely to defend a statute 
that was barely passed along partisan lines, the DOMA example proves such 
circumstances are not necessary for statutory nondefense to occur. DOMA 
 
 174 Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grab-in-the-decision-not-to-
defend-doma. 
 175 John Yoo, Obama Pushes the Limits of Executive Power in DOMA Decision, RICOCHET (Feb. 23, 
2011, 11:26 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Obama-Pushes-the-Limits-of-Executive-Power-in-DOMA-
Decision. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Kerr, supra note 174.  
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passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress in 1996, was 
signed by a Democrat president, and endured through a Democrat and 
Republican presidential administration. However, DOMA still became subject 
to nondefense fifteen years later with the emergence of a President with 
differing constitutional and political views. Thus, regardless of the 
circumstances, the nondefense of a statute “uses the legal system to short-
circuit the normal political process.”178 
III.  OVERCOMING BOWSHER’S ANTI-AGGRANDIZEMENT PRINCIPLE 
The greatest impediment to Congress possessing the primary role in 
defending the constitutionality of federal statutes is the anti-aggrandizement 
principle elaborated by the Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar.179 There, the 
Court held “‘the Legislative Branch may not exercise executive authority.’”180 
While Part I explained that defending statutes is not encompassed within 
executive authority, this Part further shows that the anti-aggrandizement 
principle is not an insurmountable barrier to allowing for the congressional 
defense of statutes. This Part first reviews the Court’s decision in Bowsher and 
subsequent responses to it, and then it applies the Bowsher framework to the 
Legislative Branch defense of statutes to demonstrate that the practice falls 
within the inherent powers of Congress. 
A. Limitations Established by Bowsher 
The Court in Bowsher set the parameters surrounding Congress’s ability to 
delegate power to Legislative Branch officials. Thus, the scope of Bowsher 
must be understood before evaluating the constitutionality of Congress 
empowering itself to defend federal statutes. 
In Bowsher, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, more commonly referred 
to as the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (the Act).181 The Act represented 
Congress’s attempt to remedy the growing national concern regarding 
increasing federal budget deficits, and it sought to set a maximum annual 
deficit amount for federal spending.182 If federal spending exceeded the 
 
 178 Yoo, supra note 175.  
 179 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 180 Id. at 766 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 181 See id. at 717 (majority opinion). 
 182 Id. 
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specified annual deficit limit for a fiscal year, the Act required across-the-
board cuts to federal programs.183 Though the Act’s proposed spending 
measures raised no constitutional concerns, controversy arose regarding the 
mechanism through which Congress implemented the spending cuts.184 
The Act’s spending cuts were determined in a series of three steps. First, 
Directors from the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional 
Budget Office created reports forecasting the budget deficit for the upcoming 
year and, if necessary, an estimate of budget cuts for each federal program.185 
Second, the Directors submitted these reports to the Comptroller General (CG), 
who reviewed the reports and independently recommended spending 
reductions for each federal program.186 Finally, the CG reported his 
recommendations to the President, who then had to execute the reductions 
exactly as suggested by the CG.187 
The Court in Bowsher held that the power Congress delegated to the CG to 
make binding recommendations to the President represented an attempt by 
Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of the Executive Branch, and thus 
it was unconstitutional.188 In doing so, the Court applied a two-part test to 
examine how the duties of the CG fit within the separation-of-powers 
framework. 
The first step in the Bowsher framework was to determine whether the CG 
acted as an agent of the Legislative or Executive Branch.189 The critical factor 
in the Court’s analysis was that, though the President nominated the CG, the 
CG was removable only by an initiative of Congress and for a specific list of 
reasons.190 The Court also considered the perceptions of Congress and former 
CGs in its reasoning; both members of Congress and former CGs had 
explicitly expressed their belief that the CG was an agent of the Legislative 
Branch.191 Because the Court found the CG acted as an agent of the Legislative 
Branch and that Congress reserved the exclusive power of removal over the 
 
 183 Id. at 717–18. 
 184 See id. at 718–19. 
 185 Id. at 718. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See id. at 736 (concluding that the powers vested in the CG violated the constitutional requirement that 
Congress play no direct role in executing the laws). 
 189 See id. at 727–28 (determining whether the CG performs his duties independently from Congress). 
 190 Id. (permitting the CG to be removed for any of the following bases: permanent disability, 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude).  
 191 See id. at 731. 
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CG, the CG was precluded from exercising executive powers in the scope of 
his duties.192 
The second step in the Bowsher framework examined the functions of the 
CG and determined whether they were executive in nature.193 The Court’s 
focus began with the fact that the CG possessed independent, exclusive 
judgment regarding the budget recommendations made to the President.194 
Despite the argument that such responsibilities were too minor to constitute 
executing the law, the Court considered such power as “plainly entailing 
execution of the law in constitutional terms.”195 The thrust of the Court’s 
attention then remained on the fact that the Act required the President to fulfill 
the CG’s recommendations “consistent with [the Comptroller General’s] report 
in all respects.”196 The Court viewed the binding nature of the CG’s 
recommendations as evidence of Congress’s attempt to entrust the Act’s 
execution to an agent subject to its own control and removal discretion.197 The 
Court struck down this process, holding that it amounted to Congress 
impermissibly attempting to “retain[] control over the execution of the Act 
and . . . intrude[] into the executive function.”198 
In dissent, Justice White quickly identified a limitation on the Court’s 
holding that remains useful in applying the Bowsher decision to the Legislative 
Branch’s defense of statutes. Justice White noted that the Court refrained from 
accepting the argument that only officers removable by the President may 
exercise executive powers.199 Instead, the Court maintained its longstanding 
recognition that it remains “within the power of Congress under the ‘Necessary 
and Proper’ Clause to vest authority that falls within the Court’s definition of 
executive power in officers who are not subject to removal at will by the 
President and are therefore not under the President’s direct control.”200 Though 
the Court held the Act as unconstitutional, it was unwilling to find that only 
 
 192 See id. at 732. 
 193 See id. at 732–33 (considering the executive nature of the CG’s primary responsibility). 
 194 See id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252, 99 Stat. 
1038, 1074 (“The President may not modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, 
bases, amounts, or percentages set forth in the report submitted . . . .”), invalidated by Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; 
accord Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733. 
 197 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733–34 (finding that Congress retained control over execution of the Act by 
placing responsibility for its execution in the hands of an officer subject to removal only by Congress). 
 198 Id. at 734. 
 199 Id. at 761 (White, J., dissenting). 
 200 Id. (citation omitted). 
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officers removable by the President may exert executive power. When 
examining Congress’s ability to defend statutes, this element of Bowsher is 
vital. 
Along with Justice White’s dissent, subsequent analysis regarding Bowsher 
demonstrates inherent shortcomings in the majority decision. While the Court 
in Bowsher relied heavily on a formalist approach to the separation of powers, 
its analysis seemingly presumed that government functions are easily 
attributable to certain branches.201 However, executive power is “not easily 
defined because the power that the executive may possess, and the way in 
which the executive may use this power, is as varied as Congress’s ability to 
delegate authority.”202 Because the Court did not address this, it failed to 
reconcile the primary objection to formalism that, in regard to powers of each 
governmental branch, “the Constitution do[es] not establish and divide fields 
of black and white.”203 Indeed, stating that the CG performed executive 
functions—without first defining executive functions—was inadequate as a 
constitutional standard.204 
Given the point made in Justice White’s dissent from Bowsher and the fact 
that the Court failed to provide guidance as to what constitutes an executive 
versus a legislative power, the next section argues that the defense of statutes is 
encompassed within the inherent rights of Congress. 
B. Applying Bowsher to the Legislative Defense of Statutes 
While Part IV puts forth a comprehensive plan for implementing the 
Legislative Branch’s defense of statutes,205 this section applies the Bowsher 
framework to the idea’s basic tenets to illustrate that the Legislative Branch’s 
defense of statutes does not violate the anti-aggrandizement principle. In 
applying the Bowsher framework, the first step does not require detailed 
analysis. Like in Bowsher, a Legislative Branch official, nominated and 
removable by Congress, would perform the congressional defense of statutes. 
Therefore, the remaining analysis in this section focuses on the second step of 
 
 201 Russell K. Osgood, Governmental Functions and Constitutional Doctrine: The Historical 
Constitution, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 564 (1987). 
 202 Kevin T. Abikoff, Note, The Role of the Comptroller General in Light of Bowsher v. Synar, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1987). 
 203 Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 204 See Abikoff, supra note 202, at 1543. 
 205 See infra Part IV.B. 
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the Bowsher framework and whether the defense of statutes should be deemed 
a legislative power. 
Though the ability to defend statutes is not included in Congress’s 
enumerated powers, courts have been accepting of Congress delegating 
authority to legislative officials when doing so “effectuate[s] one of Congress’s 
inherent powers under the Constitution.”206 Congress’s enumerated powers 
come with inherent authority, which include nonexplicit constitutional powers 
necessary for Congress to perform its explicit constitutional duties and 
responsibilities.207 For example, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Supreme Court 
considered the power to investigate as inherent in Congress’s Article I 
powers.208 Although Congress could legislate without investigating, the Court 
noted that investigating allowed Congress to gather information to assist in 
legislating more wisely and effectively.209 
A similar argument can be made for providing Congress with the power to 
defend a statute against constitutional attack. Though Congress can pass a 
statute without possessing the power to defend it, the lack of such power 
potentially undercuts the effectiveness of its lawmaking abilities. Defending its 
statutes would allow Congress to represent its institutional interests and root its 
actions in its own constitutional authority and interpretation. If left to the 
Executive Branch, these varied interests may not be represented, and instead 
the interests and views of the President would remain the focal point in any 
litigation. Congress would be forced to endure situations in which an 
administration unenthusiastically supports its law or, alternatively, wait until 
the Executive Branch completely abandons its defense of the law in favor of its 
own constitutional interpretation. 
Considering the power to defend as an inherent congressional power also 
does not invoke the types of concerns that influenced the Court to rule against 
the Act in Bowsher. In Bowsher, the Court found especially troubling the fact 
that the CG exercised exclusive judgment in suggesting budget reductions, and 
that the Act required the President to enforce suggestions of the CG as 
presented.210 The Legislative Branch’s defense of a statute differs in that 
 
 206 Cobb, supra note 13, at 225. 
 207 Id. at 226. 
 208 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“We are of opinion that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”). 
 209 Id. at 175. 
 210 Abikoff, supra note 202, at 1541. 
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Congress’s defense of a statute’s constitutionality would have no binding 
effect on the Executive Branch. Instead, the Executive Branch, through the 
DOJ and Solicitor General, would still be able to advocate for its respective 
position as amicus curiae.211 Thus, unlike in Bowsher, the mere defense of a 
statute does not bind the Executive Branch or determine how a law is to be 
executed. As such, Congress undertaking the defense of statutes would not 
infringe upon the duties of the Executive Branch and would not violate the 
separation of powers. 
Even if not deemed to be an inherent power of Congress, the idea of the 
Legislative Branch defending statutes is nothing different than what has 
occurred for decades by both the House and Senate. As with the cases 
described above (Myers, Chadha) and many other examples (including the 
present DOMA case), the House and Senate legal counsels have litigated in 
defense of statutes, and “[no] court has ever held that these activities are out of 
bounds.”212 The idea advanced by this Comment amounts to nothing more than 
taking this already-accepted, constitutionally permissible practice and making 
it the norm. The next Part describes one of many possible ways to implement 
the new norm that this Comment proposes. 
IV.  THE CORRECT “DEPARTMENT” FOR STATUTORY DEFENSE 
Though the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 permits Congress to 
intervene when the Executive Branch declines to defend statutes,213 this 
approach fails to adequately represent congressional interests and ensure a 
proper defense for a statute. This Part reviews the current response to executive 
nondefense, and then it offers a new approach to statutory defense that aims to 
alleviate the shortcomings present in the modern system. 
 
 211 See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 212 Frost, supra note 13, at 964–65. This does not include the numerous instances when these offices, or 
individual members, or groups of members filed amicus briefs in ongoing litigation—another practice that has 
never even been challenged. Cf. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Nos. 10-56634 & 10-56813, 2011 
WL 2683238, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 2011) (holding that “[t]he Government, of course, may refrain from 
defending the constitutionality of ‘any provision of any Federal statute,’” and that “the court may allow amicus 
curiae to participate in oral argument in support of constitutionality” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2006))). 
 213 Ethics in Government Act of 1978 § 706, 2 U.S.C. § 288e (2006) (authorizing, though not requiring, 
the House or Senate OLC to intervene, thereby creating an unpredictable system in which decisions to 
intervene are made on a case-by-case basis).  
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A. Current Congressional Passivity in Statutory Defense 
The idea of empowering the Legislative Branch to play a more active role 
in representing itself is not one of first impression. Indeed, the model 
employed presently arose in the post-Watergate era when Congress attempted 
to reassert itself amidst an expanding Executive Branch,214 and the reasons for 
doing so echo those advanced by this Comment: “The Executive Branch, 
represented by the Justice Department, is in conflict with the Congress on 
many subjects. . . . If one believes that the separation of powers is 
fundamental . . . then having the Congress represented in litigation by the 
Justice Department is totally unacceptable.”215 Yet while this model helps 
ensure that a statutory defense can be made available if the Executive Branch 
decides not to defend a statute, it allows for Congress to play only a reactive 
role in defending its laws. 
The basis for the present model rests in the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978.216 The Act created the Senate Legal Counsel office (SLC)217 for the 
purpose of providing defense, advice, and litigation support in matters related 
to its investigations and defense in civil suits.218 Specifically in regard to 
defending statutes, the Act expressly permits the SLC to defend a statute when 
the constitutional power of Congress to make laws or the constitutionality of 
acts of Congress are challenged.219 Shortly thereafter, a similar office emerged 
to handle many of the same duties for the House of Representatives.220 And 
though both offices perform valuable services, each remains limited to only 
representing the interests of its respective chamber. 
The most notable deficiency in the current functions of the House and 
Senate Legal Counsel offices is that, even with the presence of each office, 
Congress only possesses a secondary role in defending statutes. Despite the 
fact that the law calls upon the SLC to “defend vigorously when placed in 
 
 214 See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the 
Institutional Congressional Client, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 47, 48 (noting that Congress 
created the Senate Legal Counsel office in 1978 in reaction to a need for representation in the post-Watergate 
era). 
 215 Frost, supra note 13, at 950–51 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 216 Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 701–716, 92 Stat. 1824, 1875–85 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 288 
(2006)). 
 217 See Tiefer, supra note 214, at 48. 
 218 See id. at 49. 
 219 See 2 U.S.C. § 288h (2006). 
 220 See Tiefer, supra note 214, at 49. 
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issue . . . the constitutionality of Acts and joint resolutions of the Congress,”221 
Congress has relied upon the Executive Branch tradition of defending 
statutes222 and reserved a role for itself only to the extent that the Executive 
Branch chooses to not defend a statute.223 Presently, the only instances in 
which Congress plays the lead role in statutory defense is when the Attorney 
General notifies the SLC of an instance when the Attorney General or 
Department of Justice decides not to enforce or apply a federal law or not to 
defend a law against constitutional attack.224 
Thus, Congress deprives itself of the ability to assert the constitutional 
interpretation that initially justified a piece of legislation by ceding its ability to 
defend the statutes it has passed. While this point remains moot so long as the 
Executive Branch remains loyal to Congress’s interpretations, a 
departmentalist approach to defending statutes—where each branch is 
permitted to adopt varying constitutional interpretations—accentuates the 
problem. 
Additionally, whether a statute receives a defense remains in constant flux, 
as the Executive Branch may change its decision to defend based on the 
administration in office.225 This scenario was illustrated by DOMA: DOMA 
passed overwhelmingly through Congress, was signed by a Democrat 
President, and the Clinton and Bush Administrations defended the law and 
advocated in its favor. However, the Obama Administration rejected these 
constitutional interpretations and President Obama’s interpretation took 
priority in the Administration’s nondefense.226 The justification Congress 
employed to defend the law emerged only after Congress intervened following 
the recommendation of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG).227 
Even if the Executive Branch does defend a statute, no guarantee exists it 
will do so with the veracity and zealousness that Congress otherwise might. 
 
 221 2 U.S.C. § 288h. 
 222 Supra Part I.B. 
 223 See Days, supra note 12, at 502. 
 224 2 U.S.C. § 288e. 
 225 See Waxman, supra note 9, at 1084 (describing how President H.W. Bush declined to defend the Cable 
Television Act of 1992, but then how President Clinton took up the defense upon being elected). 
 226 See Attorney General’s Letter, supra note 1 (recognizing that the DOJ has previously defended 
DOMA); supra Part II.C. 
 227 Presumably, if the House were under Democrat control, the BLAG would have not made the same 
recommendation and DOMA would not have received a defense. Indeed, Minority Leader Pelosi voiced 
disapproval and even filed an amicus brief in opposition to the Advisory Group’s recommended defense for 
the statute. See Pelosi Amicus Brief, supra note 170. 
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Indeed, some see a weakened form of statutory defense as an example of the 
Executive Branch “using litigation as a form of post-enactment veto of 
legislation that the current administration dislikes.”228 History has shown 
multiple administrations that have taken part in that very practice. For instance, 
in Oregon v. Mitchell,229 Solicitor General Erwin Griswold defended a statute 
that President Nixon believed to be unconstitutional.230 Though Griswold 
defended the statute’s constitutionality to the Court, his argument began by 
petitioning the Court to consider the fact that the President and Department of 
Justice viewed the law as unconstitutional.231 Similar behavior occurred in 
Buckley v. Valeo.232 There, Solicitor General Robert Bork argued on behalf of 
the Federal Elections Commission and the Attorney General as parties to the 
case, yet simultaneously filed a separate brief on behalf of the opposition.233 In 
instances such as these, the Solicitors General went through the motion of 
defending a statute yet actively supported arguments contrary to the statute’s 
defense.234 Because Congress was following the tradition of Executive Branch 
statutory defense, Congress’s only recourse in those instances was to file a 
brief as amicus curiae.235 
The Executive Branch may also fail to put forth credible arguments when 
defending a statute.236 Though this occurrence is difficult to sometimes show, 
the recent decisions of the Obama Administration in regard to DOMA Section 
3 illustrate a good example. In a brief meant to defend DOMA, the 
Administration wrote that “the United States does not believe that DOMA is 
rationally related to any legitimate government interests in procreation and 
child-rearing and is therefore not relying upon any such interests to defend 
DOMA’s constitutionality.”237 However, this was the exact rationale that had 
been cited in previous defenses of DOMA in litigation and by the House 
 
 228 See Days, supra note 12, at 502. 
 229 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 230 See Waxman, supra note 9, at 1081 (noting that President Nixon believed Congress had no power to 
enact the Voting Rights Act). 
 231 See id. at 1081–82. 
 232 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 233 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1082. 
 234 See id. at 1081–82. 
 235 See Days, supra note 12, at 502. 
 236 See Defending Marriage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 47 (2011) (statement of Edward Whelan, President, Ethics and Public Policy Center) 
[hereinafter Defending Marriage Hearing]. 
 237 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant U.S.’s Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, Smelt v. United States, 
No. SACV 09-00286 DOC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009). 
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Judiciary Committee as an interest that Congress considered when it enacted 
DOMA.238 Thus, the Executive Branch cannot always be trusted to articulate 
the strongest argument in favor of a law’s constitutionality.239 
Taken together, these reasons reflect why the current model of statutory 
defense does more in giving the President unfettered discretion over the 
defense and enforcement of statutes than it does in protecting Congress as an 
institution and the laws it passes. The abbreviated role that Congress plays in 
statutory defense under the current model leaves statutes overly vulnerable to 
attack and distorts the balance of powers between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches. To avoid the Legislative Branch’s interpretation from 
being entirely diluted, and to ensure the interpretation that permitted a statute 
to pass remains intact, the Legislative Branch should undertake the primary 
responsibility of defending its own laws. 
B. Congress Should Amend the Ethics in Government Act and Defend Itself 
This section proposes a model by which the Legislative Branch undertakes 
the predominate responsibility in defending statutes. In all situations the model 
requires the Legislative Branch to ensure each law that is challenged receives a 
zealous defense. To implement such a policy effectively, three substantive 
changes to the Act would be appropriate: (1) create an Office of Congressional 
Legal Services to be primarily responsible for statutory defense; (2) explicitly 
provide for when and how this office undertakes statutory defense; and (3) 
eliminate all exceptions to statutory defense as they apply to the Legislative 
Branch. 
1. Creating the Office of Congressional Legal Services 
The first substantive amendment to the Act should call for the creation of 
an Office of Congressional Legal Services (CLS) for the distinct purpose of 
defending the constitutionality of statutes. Before elaborating on this notion, it 
is vital to note that the creation of the CLS would not replace the House and 
Senate Offices of Legal Counsel. Both chambers benefit from having 
respective offices from which members may garner legal advice and assistance 
in the performance of their duties.240 Instances arise when the individual 
 
 238 See Defending Marriage Hearing, supra note 236, at 14–15.  
 239 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1079. 
 240 See, e.g., Office of General Counsel, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.ogc.house.gov/ (last 
visited May 12, 2013). 
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chamber and its members require separate representation or have institutional 
interests separate from its counterpart.241  
Yet with the rise of competing constitutional interpretations from different 
branches under departmentalism, the CLS would be charged with the duty to 
defend the work of the Congress rather than its individual components. 
Because a presumption of constitutionality accompanies each law “passed [by] 
the House of Representatives and the Senate,”242 the CLS would zealously 
represent that notion against competing constitutional interpretations. 
As opposed to the current method of ad hoc representation,243 the CLS 
would be the automatic, unified standard-bearer for the Legislative Branch’s 
coequal constitutional interpretation. All challenges to a law’s constitutionality 
would automatically be presented to the CLS, and the CLS would maintain full 
authority regarding how to proceed. For instance, if the CLS is wary of 
whether and how the Executive Branch would defend a statute, then the CLS 
would undertake the law’s defense. However, if the interests of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches align, the CLS may defer to the Executive Branch if 
it feels as if the law will be defended adequately. Regardless of the option 
chosen, the sole objective of the CLS would be ensuring that the 
constitutionality of a challenged law is adequately defended at the onset and 
through the conclusion of any litigation. 
While litigation regarding the constitutionality of a statute may occur after 
changes in party leadership or composition, creating the CLS would provide a 
sense of continuity that would help minimize scenarios where partisan divides 
cause differing approaches to defending a law. For example, the CLS would 
invariably defend laws passed in a different congressional session than the 
current one. Though that defense may be different than the viewpoint prevalent 
within the present Congress (e.g., a law passed under Republican leadership is 
challenged after Democrats regain the majority), the present Congress would 
always possess the ability to render such a defense useless by passing a 
different law to reflect its changing views.244 
 
 241 See id.  
 242 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added); accord INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
 243 See 2 U.S.C. § 288e (2006). 
 244 Indeed, one of the striking elements of the DOMA litigation is that the Obama Administration decision 
not to defend the law occurred less than two years after Democrats held control over the White House and both 
houses of Congress. Rather than trying to undermine the law by not defending it in court, the Administration 
and Democrats in Congress could have revoked it through separate legislation during that time. The fact they 
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Additionally, other scenarios would arise where one house favors 
defending the law while the other favors nondefense. Forming the CLS will 
prevent a fragmented congressional response toward the statute’s defense and 
instead provide a unified, assured defense. Despite the partisan frustrations this 
would cause on both sides of the spectrum at any given point, the consistency 
in defense provided by the CLS would allow for a more reputable 
representation—one that transcends party differences or agendas—that allows 
the CLS to develop a trusted relationship with the Court. 
To further maximize its effectiveness and legitimacy, Congress should 
create the CLS to function in the same manner and with the same level of 
independence that the Office of the Solicitor General shares with the President, 
Attorney General, and various Executive agencies.245 Indeed, this 
independence enables the Solicitor General to maintain a reputable, relatively 
nonpolitical stature, which allows his arguments to carry more weight and 
relevance when presented to the Court.246 Creating a Legislative Branch office 
based on this example would help to counter the Executive Branch positions 
offered by the Solicitor General and promote the long-term institutional 
interests of Congress. Even if the Legislative Branch arguments are ultimately 
unsuccessful, the presence of competing interpretations would require both 
branches to put forth stronger, more complete arguments. Only in that situation 
could the Court make a conclusion “with assurance that it had considered the 
very best arguments that could be made in its defense.”247 
In many ways, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides an 
initial vision that this Comment’s proposed congressional office should follow. 
The CRS is a group of “approximately 675 employees includ[ing] lawyers, 
economists, reference librarians, and social, natural, and physical scientists”248 
that serves Congress by working by request for all congressional committees 
and members of Congress.249 The CRS provides research, testimony, and 
consultations throughout the entire legislative process, including the 
formulation of ideas for legislation and analyzing the legality of a specific 
 
did not makes it seem even more likely that they are using the judicial system as the vehicle to achieving 
political ends without spending much political capital. 
 245 See Days, supra note 12, at 493. 
 246 See Marcott, supra note 5, at 1324–25 (describing the advantages the Solicitor General garners from 
his frequent appearances and familiarity in front of the Supreme Court). 
 247 Waxman, supra note 9, at 1079. 
 248 IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33471, THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE AND 
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2 (2011). 
 249 Id. at 5–6. 
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bill.250 The purpose of the CRS is to create responsible, effective policy, and it 
achieves this by providing objective, nonpartisan, and confidential services to 
all members of Congress.251 In the same way the CRS possesses institutional 
credibility by committing itself to providing objective, nonpartisan research, 
the CLS would also best protect the legal institutional interests of Congress. 
The consolidation of such power in the CLS would present difficulties in 
preventing partisan agendas from dictating actions of the CLS. Thus, systems 
must be in place to ensure members of Congress maintain a relatively low level 
of authority over the CLS. Most important in this regard is the fact that, to a 
large extent, members must recognize that the CLS is to serve the institution of 
Congress and not individual parties or members. Much like the Solicitor 
General’s reputation of independence derives largely from the fact that the 
President and members of the Executive Branch do not direct the Solicitor 
General’s actions, the CLS must also be allowed to operate independently 
within the Legislative Branch. For instance, the fact that the CLS will be 
defending the constitutionality of a statute as it was passed will likely often put 
the CLS at odds with the ever-changing majorities and viewpoints predominant 
in Congress. If the CLS were to adapt its arguments based on these changing 
viewpoints, then its defense would become as fickle and unpredictable as the 
current system of Executive Branch defense. Thus, instead of attempting to 
alter how the CLS defends a statute, members of Congress must remain 
cognizant of the need for CLS independence and seek to pass new laws—
rather than attempting to influence the CLS—to reflect any views they possess 
that differ with the CLS. 
Additional safeguards can also be implemented in the formation of the CLS 
to further insulate it from political pressures. In terms of appointing a 
Legislative Branch official to oversee the CLS, Congress must provide a 
bipartisan mechanism to satisfy both parties and remain as politically neutral as 
possible. A potential method is for Congress to look toward the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group252 for a general framework, but then add additional 
safeguards to it. As it stands, the BLAG is comprised of five members of the 
 
 250 See id. at 6 (describing the role of the CRS at all stages of the legislative process). 
 251 See id. at 2. 
 252 See Press Release, John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Statement by House 
Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.speaker.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=227372 (“Under House rules, the advisory 
group has the authority to instruct the non-partisan office of the House General Counsel to take legal action on 
behalf of the House of Representatives.”). 
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House leadership,253 and it directs the House General Counsel’s office to file 
an amicus brief or determine how a law is to be defended when the Executive 
Branch declines.254 An improvement to this would be to convene a legal “Gang 
of Eight,” including the leaders of the two parties from the Senate and House 
and the chairs and ranking minority members of the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees.255 Rather than giving the majority party ultimate 
control, which is the case with the BLAG, this partisan-neutral group would 
first reach a consensus on a proposed leader, and then that nominee would 
require approval by votes of both houses. Though impossible to rid such a 
process of partisan preferences completely, this method would help to isolate 
the process as much as possible. Not only would party leaders who presumably 
received input from their party members agree upon the nominee, but also the 
rigid standards suggested for CLS in the next subsection would minimize the 
partisan element surrounding this director’s decisions. 
Additionally, much like the Solicitor General hires deputies and attorney 
assistants, Congress should permit and provide a budget for the CLS director to 
appoint and hire similarly situated officials. Again, to ensure the office 
maintains its creditability and neutrality, either the legal Gang of Eight or the 
full Congress should reserve for itself oversight over the process. For instance, 
Congress could require a simple or supermajority approval for appointed 
deputy positions, while later entrusting such appointees to hire additional staff. 
Congress could also impose terms on positions within CLS so as to provide 
regular checks for approval and effectiveness of those serving. 
2. How CLS Should Operate 
To avoid encroaching on the rightful duty of the Executive Branch to 
enforce statutes, Congress’s second amendment to the Ethics in Government 
 
 253 Id. (“The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group is a five-member panel consisting of the Speaker of the 
House, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip.”).  
 254 See McCarthy Statement on the Defense of Marriage Act, CONGRESSMAN & MAJORITY WHIP KEVIN 
MCCARTHY, http://kevinmccarthy.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=94 
(last visited May 12, 2013). 
 255 The Gang of Eight is a colloquial term used to describe a set of eight leaders serving in the United 
States Congress. Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 
504 (2010) (“The Gang of Eight consists of the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional 
intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority 
and minority leaders of the Senate.”). Currently, the Office of Senate Legal Counsel implements something 
similar. The Senate legal counsel reports to the Joint Leadership Group of the Senate, which includes members 
of the leadership of both parties. See Frost, supra note 13, at 943. 
HANSEN GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013 10:51 AM 
1198 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1159 
Act must clarify how and when the CLS shall become involved in litigation. 
As earlier noted, the CLS responsibilities should closely mirror those of the 
Solicitor General, and the statute provides that the Solicitor General “may 
conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court and . . . in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . in which the United 
States is interested.”256 Thus, any amendment to the Ethics in Government Act 
must designate that the CLS argue on behalf of the United States only in 
matters where the constitutionality of statutes is challenged. This permits all 
prosecutorial matters and instances in which the execution of the law is 
challenged to remain the prerogative of the Executive Branch. 
The clearest situation in which the CLS might become involved is when a 
constitutional issue is identified from the start of litigation. When this is the 
case, the CLS can involve itself at the outset. The CLS and Solicitor General 
can then serve as two distinct parties defending the separate claims in a single 
suit. The Solicitor General currently employs a practice similar to this when 
private parties litigate and the U.S. government has an interest in the outcome. 
For instance, the Solicitor General often receives time during oral arguments in 
front of the Court to express the position of the United States.257 
Much more difficult is the scenario in which the constitutional issue arises 
in the midst of litigation that the Executive Branch was litigating on its own. 
Here, Congress will need to provide a way in which the constitutional issue 
can be appropriately severed from the substantive issue so that CLS can defend 
the constitutionality of the statute. While this might seem challenging, 
evaluating some European models of analyzing constitutional questions lends 
guidance.258 
For instance, the Italian model represents a way in which the question of 
the constitutionality of a statute can be severed and decided separately from the 
initial enforcement of law. There, when a constitutional question arises, 
proceedings are stopped and the constitutional question is sent to the Italian 
Constitutional Court.259 That Court then decides the constitutional question and 
sends it back to the original court so that the case may resume.260 Similarly in 
America, under the proposed model, any constitutional question that arises can 
 
 256 28 U.S.C. § 518(a)–(b) (2006). 
 257 See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
 258 See supra text accompanying notes 32–38. 
 259 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 32, at 1688. 
 260 Id. 
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be instantly assigned to the CLS for defense during the litigation. Once the 
constitutionality is decided, the case can either conclude or return to the 
Executive Branch to resume enforcement proceedings. 
While separating the constitutional issue like this leads to a slower, more 
inefficient process, slightly adjusting this model helps resolve that issue. For 
example, permitting the CLS to defer to the Executive Branch to defend 
statutes for all routine, noncontroversial issues eliminates unnecessary wastes 
of time and resources. In other words, where the interests of the branches align, 
the CLS can simply allow the Executive Branch to defend the statute so as to 
prevent the issue from having to be litigated separately. Though this reverts 
back to the type of statutory defense that exists now, the difference is that the 
Legislative Branch dictates when the Executive Branch becomes involved and 
not vice versa. Further, CLS can reserve the ability to reenter the case if it 
deems the Executive Branch is providing an insufficient or erroneous defense. 
Alternatively, in Germany and Spain, constitutional complaints can be filed 
after a case has been completely resolved by the courts.261 At that point, a 
constitutional court reexamines the case as a whole for any constitutional 
issues or errors.262 If a constitutional issue arises, the court may rule on it and 
decide whether the original decision can remain intact.263 This type of system 
permits a variation of the canon of constitutional avoidance that is often 
employed by American courts and would limit constitutional questions from 
arising only where violations of the substantive law are found to exist. 
Because defending the constitutionality of statutes does not fall under the 
scope of Executive Branch powers,264 and because Congress is already 
permitted to argue or designate someone to argue on behalf of the United 
States in certain instances,265 extending this power to the Legislative Branch in 
such instances will not encroach upon executive powers. 
3. No Congressional Exceptions to Defend 
Lastly, Congress should amend the Ethics in Government Act so as to 
ensure the CLS must always provide a zealous defense to all laws. To that end, 
Congress should statutorily eliminate the two exceptions that the Executive 
 
 261 Id. at 1690. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See id. 
 264 See supra Part II.C. 
 265 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978 § 706, 2 U.S.C. § 288e (2006). 
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Branch has carved out in regard to its tradition of defending statutes.266 For 
starters, neither exception adopted by the Executive Branch makes sense for 
the Legislative Branch to continue. More importantly, the emergence of 
departmentalism makes it vital for the CLS to represent the institutional 
interests of the Legislative Branch by consistently defending the constitutional 
interpretation that Congress adopted when they created the law. 
First, the Legislative Branch need not refrain from defending statutes that 
the President perceives as encroaching on Executive Branch powers. While 
departmentalism permits the President to come to a conclusion regarding how 
a law affects his powers, it also allows for the CLS to make a countering 
determination that the law validly respects executive power. Thus, in cases 
where this constitutional issue is litigated, CLS should present the Legislative 
Branch interpretation. To be sure, this does not necessarily exclude the 
Executive Branch or render the Solicitor General’s arguments moot. In many 
instances the Court may request the Solicitor General’s position,267 or the 
Solicitor General may still independently request time to orally present its 
arguments to the Court or file as amicus curiae in the case to present its own 
interpretation. In such a case, that situation actually mirrors examples like 
Mitchell and Buckley because the Executive Branch retains the ability to 
express its negative opinion regarding the law. The vital difference, however, 
is that under the proposed model the Legislative Branch interpretation is 
assured of receiving a complete and zealous defense. 
The Legislative Branch should also refrain from creating an exception that 
permits nondefense if it believes the statute is unconstitutional. Though the 
Executive Branch utilizes that exception, inherent differences between the 
branches make it unnecessary for Congress to do the same. First, Congress 
passed the statute and should be called to vigorously defend its own work.268 
Second, and more importantly, Congress possesses a power absent in the 
Executive Branch: the power to repeal or amend the law. Thus, if Congress 
 
 266 See supra Part II.C. 
 267 See Days, supra note 12, at 488. 
 268 This could be in reference to the present session of Congress passing a statute, or to previous sessions 
that passed the statute with different leadership, members, and procedures. Either way, the institutional 
interests of Congress are served when defending a law that was passed and has yet to be amended or repealed. 
Though current members of Congress may not agree with laws passed in previous sessions, the future viability 
of the laws that current members pass relies on an expectation that Congress will carry out the proper 
procedure to effect statutory change. 
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believes a law to be unconstitutional, it should change the law by passing a bill 
through both houses and presenting it to the President for his signature. 
Institutional hurdles certainly exist in overturning a law in this last 
instance. Institutional processes like filibusters and holdouts, not to mention a 
frequent lack of political coalition or agreement, prevent and delay laws from 
being passed. Yet just because Congress may not be in a position to change the 
law does not mean it should seek to void the present law through nondefense. 
Indeed, Congress may permit the CLS to advise members of Congress or 
testify at committee hearings regarding its belief in the unconstitutionality of a 
statute. But the CLS should not possess the ability to avoid defending the 
statute so as to avoid the same types of instances of nondefense that exist under 
the current system. 
While ensuring statutory defense may seem positive to some, opponents 
will invariably object to Congress being forced into taking a constitutional 
position on every issue. Indeed, it may very well not be politically and 
ideologically expedient for the CLS to defend unpopular or outdated statutes, 
and certainly each party may attempt to force litigation in attempts to utilize 
the issue politically. Though the CLS will be insulated from members of 
Congress and the political pressures within each chamber, it will be impossible 
for members to prevent all negative attention surrounding the defense from 
being imputed onto them.269 
Yet within this potential objection to the mandatory defense of statutes 
arise two additional positive benefits. First, forcing the CLS to take a 
constitutional position adds a layer of accountability and legitimacy on 
members of Congress as they pass legislation. While previous efforts 
attempted to do this through tactics like requiring Congress to specify the exact 
constitutional provision on which a proposed law was based,270 creating the 
CLS will help ensure constitutional validity in the event of litigation and 
prevent the Legislative Branch from hiding behind the shield of executive 
statutory defense when constitutional questions arise. Second, the political 
pressures that mandatory defense cause will also likely force Congress to pass 
 
 269 The DOMA example yet again illustrates this point. While still defending the law, President Obama 
received much criticism from LGBT supporters to the extent that some commentators believe he was 
politically pressured into changing positions. Moreover, upon the House taking up defense of the bill, 
Democrats seized on the political opportunity and attempted to use it against Republican lawmakers. See 
Defending Marriage Hearing, supra note 236, at 48. 
 270 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES R. XII (requiring a “statement citing as specifically as 
practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution”). 
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bipartisan legislation. No longer can Congress sit back as the Executive Branch 
takes criticism; rather, members of Congress will need to endure political 
pressure or look to a compromise on the issue in question. 
C. Implications for the Executive Branch Relinquishing the Duty to Defend  
While this Comment has focused on the details and effects of the 
Legislative Branch undertaking the defense of statutes, attention must also be 
given to the implications that such a decision might have on the Executive 
Branch. Though the defense of statutes arose originally out of convenience,271 
the tradition continues to “foster[] comity” between the two branches.272 Thus, 
replacing the Solicitor General’s role in statutory defense may cause tension 
between the two branches, especially in that it may pit them as adversaries in 
litigation regarding a statute’s constitutionality. Yet despite this, the Executive 
Branch possesses two legitimate reasons for allowing the Legislative Branch to 
assume the duty to defend. 
First, relinquishing the duty to defend strengthens the Executive Branch by 
allowing the DOJ and Solicitor General to serve fully at the pleasure of the 
President. Whereas defending statutes often subjected the Solicitor General to 
the pressure of having to “interpret the law independently of the rest of the 
executive agencies he represents,”273 the CLS will allow for the Solicitor 
General to more freely argue for the interests of the Executive Branch. 
Especially under departmentalist thought, where the President has a 
“responsibility to interpret the law independently from the Supreme Court,”274 
the Solicitor General “must project vigorously, albeit respectfully, the 
President’s distinctive constitutional voice.”275 Not only must the Solicitor 
General represent the President’s position, but also he is uniquely able to do so 
because of the rapport he holds with the Court.276 He appears most often and 
has a familiarity with the Court that would be better utilized on behalf of the 
Executive Branch.277 Even if the CLS assumed the responsibility of defending 
statutes and was the main litigator in this regard, the Executive Branch could 
 
 271 Supra Part II.B. 
 272 See Days, supra note 12, at 502. 
 273 John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and 
Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 801 (1992) (book review). 
 274 Id. at 802. 
 275 Id. 
 276 See Days, supra note 12, at 487–88. 
 277 See id. at 487–89. 
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still file an amicus brief and request time at oral arguments278 to represent the 
views of the President. 
Second, the CLS’s defense of statutes will deflect negative political 
attention away from the Executive Branch. Instead of being forced to defend a 
law with which the President or his party and supporters disagree, the 
Executive Branch can clearly and unequivocally defend the position it prefers. 
As previously mentioned, the fact that the Solicitor General acts relatively 
independently from the President and the rest of the Executive Branch often is 
not enough to prevent discontent from being cast upon the President. 
Completely stripping the Solicitor General and the Executive Branch of their 
role in statutory defense is the only way of separating the President from the 
action. 
Thus, the Executive Branch actually has much to gain from allowing the 
Legislative Branch to defend the constitutionality of statutes. Not only will it 
be able to advocate the interests and positions of the President as they pertain 
to statutes, but it can also avoid the political mess often entailed in defending 
controversial laws with which it disagrees. Even if Congress were not to take 
action to amend the Ethics in Government Act and allow for Legislative 
Branch statutory defense, the Executive Branch should consider establishing a 
custom under which the Solicitor General defers to the Legislative Branch in 
instances of statutory defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent decades have seen the emergence of departmentalism and each 
branch taking it upon itself to render constitutional interpretations in the 
performance of its duties. One consequence has been the increasing trend of 
the Executive Branch to refrain from its tradition of defending the 
constitutionality of federal statutes when challenged in litigation. While some 
scholarship has analyzed the President’s tradition of defending statutes and the 
recognized exceptions to that tradition, this Comment suggests that the 
Executive Branch’s defense of statutes should be the exception and not the 
rule. 
Thus, this Comment argues that the Legislative Branch should undertake 
the primary responsibility in defending federal statutes and, only when the 
 
 278 See SUP. CT. R. 28. 
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Legislative and Executive Branches agree upon how a statute is to be 
defended, should the Legislative Branch consider deferring to the Executive 
Branch for statutory defense. This Comment argues that the ability to defend 
statutes is inherent within Congress’s Article I powers, that the Executive 
Branch tradition of defending statutes is not constitutionally mandated under 
Article II, and that allowing the Legislative Branch to put forward its own 
constitutional arguments would serve the institutional interests of Congress. By 
suggesting the creation of a Legislative Branch office capable of undertaking 
statutory defense, this Comment provides a mechanism through which courts 
can be presented with comprehensive arguments of a case from which they can 
make better, more informed decisions regarding a statute’s constitutionality. 
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